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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY RICHARD B. BILDER

REVIEW ESSAY
NEW APPROACHES TO CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Perils of Global Legalism. By Eric A. Posner.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2009. Pp. xvii, 266. Index. $29.
How International Law Works: A Rational Choice
Theory. By Andrew T. Guzman. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xi, 260.
Index. $35, £22.50, cloth; $24.95, £15.99,
paper.
Customary International Law: A New Theory with
Practical Applications. By Brian D. Lepard.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010. Pp. xx, 419. Index. $125, £70, cloth;
$54.99, £38, paper.
After a century of benign neglect, international
law theorizing has suddenly taken off. No article
can proceed without an obligatory assortment of
theoretical epigrams. Books on theory are published, like the three under review here. Lawyers at
cocktail parties chat about nothing other than
legal theory and Bernie Madoff. Judges join the
cacophony as the international claims they are
called upon to adjudicate go global. Everyone
seems to be talking about theory, but few seem to
be listening. Ah well, it’s early days. International
law proceeds—as my great mentor Richard Baxter
once said about how long it took to get an article
into the British Year Book—“under the aspect of
eternity.” Since then the Year Book has been running hard to catch up to its annual title, but
strangely the volumes are getting thicker rather
than thinner. Perhaps theory, cleverly concealed

under its austere prose, is responsible for the avoirdupois.
The three contributors to legal theory under
review here can be placed along a linear spectrum,
with Eric Posner at the extreme political science
end, Brian Lepard at the opposite international
law end, and Andrew Guzman holding up the
middle.
The simplest theory of international law is that
it does not exist. Posner, a newcomer to the field,
seemingly took that position in his earlier book coauthored with Jack Goldsmith called The Limits of
International Law (2005). The only international
law I found in that book was in its title. But Posner
now maintains in his elegantly written monograph
The Perils of Global Legalism that he never said that
international law does not exist or that it is nothing
but collective gamesmanship writ large.
He begins his explanation with a circularity:
“International law is effective because states defer
to it; they defer to it because it is effective.” I confess that this struck me as a truism neatly limned.
But the author tells us that the rest of his book will
be devoted to breaking through the circle.
The first thrust is his argument that international law is effective only when it is so inconsequential that no state bothers to violate it. Like
most game strategists, Posner tends to philosophical presentism: the past does not exist, we live only
in the now. Perhaps a more historical view would
reveal that a great many rules that now appear
inconsequential were once the subjects of violent
conflicts that were eventually resolved by recourse
to customary international law. Not that customary law preceded the conflicts, but rather that rules
of international law evolved to push for and incorporate the settlements that were reached. Today
those rules may seem like fossils from beyond
space and time.
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I have more sympathy with Posner’s second stab
at circle-penetration. “The military intervention
in Kosovo by NATO forces,” he writes, “violated
the UN Charter and was clearly illegal. . . . Many
international lawyers cut the Gordian knot by
declaring the war ‘illegal but legitimate.’ ” The latter weasel words (as FDR used to call them) bother
me as much as they do Posner. He explains: “But
this is only to say that states can depart from international law when they have good reasons.” His
punch line is that “international law will always be
more appealing in theory than in practice.”
Although I agree that the Kosovo bombing was
illegal, for me it was because some of the hothead
NATO pilots flew beyond Kosovo and dropped
bombs on river bridges in Belgrade that were
crowded with pedestrians at the noon hour. Posner’s explanation that states routinely find good
reasons for departing from international law is
unpersuasive. So do bank robbers depart from
municipal law when they have good reasons, and
Winona Ryder shoplifts even though she can
afford to buy all the dresses in the store. It is the
penalties for violation that deter (but not always
prevent) states, bank robbers, and movie actresses
from lawbreaking every time they spot an opportunity.
Having been corralled by political scientists,
Posner echoes the party line that diplomats and
governmental experts can better manage interstate
conflicts than international lawyers, who are
always a step or two behind due to their occupational hazard of perusing precedents instead of
spinning out scenarios. Yet how would that
explain that it was an international lawyer who
predicted in the early days of the Balkan civil wars
that Kosovo would emerge as the most intractable
hot spot? Burns Weston perceived legal tangles
that would inevitably lead to political and military
confrontation. But the experts and neocons at the
time viewed those legal problems as so many electric cords crisscrossing on the floor, good for nothing but to be walked over. The point here is a general one: Posner’s thesis, stated in his title, is the
perils of global legalism. Perhaps he really does fear
international law more than one would infer from
the diminished status he accords it in the rest of his
book. But the Kosovo example suggests a contrary
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thesis—that Posner should fear unconstrained
experts and diplomats more one would infer from
the enhanced status he gives them in the rest of
his book.
“Illegitimate but legal”? France’s explanation
could be the Duc de la Rouchefoucauld’s maxim:
“Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue.”
“Insufficient,” responds customary international
law, “you can’t make a rule out of that maxim.”
For despite the Kosovo example, we have the torture example. Just about every government in the
world condemns torture and nevertheless looks
the other way when authorizing it. Political scientists would say that it’s the practice that counts—
international law is simply hortatory. But the
important thing is that no nation justifies torture
or claims it is legal. If states do it anyway, they
never say that what they are doing is consistent
with, much less required by, customary international law. The Torture Victims Protection Act, a
new part of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, chips away at immunity for foreign sovereigns
who engage in or condone torture. The customary
rule is obvious: torture is a clear violation of customary international law. Or to put it theoretically: torture does not count as practice if no state
cites it as practice.
There is one epigraph out of the Kosovo mess
that I bequeath to the polysci crowd. A pilot in the
German Air section of NATO was heard to
remark that it sure felt great invading Europe again
after all these years.
Posner’s final attempt to pierce the circle is his
discovery that international law “is not backed by
a world government that has the support of a
global community.” Therefore, he concludes,
only a part (the easy part) of international relations
can be successfully legalized, but much of it cannot. I think this a bit like Robin yelling across to
Batman that all we need now is a skyhook. No,
Robin, there is no world government waiting to
descend from the clouds, and frankly I’m relieved.
With so many politicians governing me at the
local, state, and national levels, I do not need
another layer of unaccountable officials on top.
Who knows what they might compel me to do,
say, worship, believe, or think?
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Au fond, what political scientists seemingly find
it impossible to understand is that rules of law can
back other rules of law in a long, but finite,
regress—a function of the heterogeneity of rules
suggested by recent studies in complexity theory.
One does not need a commander cracking the
whip. But even if we had such a supreme commander (Ms. World?), we would still want her to
abide by the constitutive rules of her office. Otherwise, we would be no better off than we are now,
perhaps a lot worse.
Hopefully, Posner—in his next book—will
move closer to the center of the spectrum and give
some company to Andrew Guzman, author of
How International Law Works. Guzman contends
that international law works because states have an
interest in complying with it. Posner could reply
that there is no independent, provable evidence
that states comply with international law; it’s just
that they often appear to be complying with it. Let
us proceed to examine how Guzman copes with
this basic difficulty.
Guzman’s definition of customary international law also struck me as a truism neatly limned:
“those norms that, because they are considered to
be law, affect state payoffs.” But doesn’t that conceal a circularity that Guzman should be breaking
through? He wants to find out whether customary
law affects state behavior. He wants to know how
international law works. Is he begging the question in saying law is that which works because it
affects state payoffs? He summons rational choice
theory. That theory, at least as it has been developed so far, can describe communication matrices
when the players (nation-states) agree in advance
on a protocol that specifies the ordered values of
their individual moves. If the protocol includes
rules of international law, it’s because you inputted them—a waste of time. For the computer program will produce only law-free outcomes that may
or may not coincide with relevant international rules.
That would support Posner’s conclusion.
Guzman is not giving up. He departs momentarily from computer programming to explain in
ordinary language that because states interact
repeatedly over time, a state that violates a rule
today may compromise its ability to insist upon
compliance by another state of a different rule
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tomorrow. Thus what makes a state comply is safeguarding its own reputation. When a state violates
a rule of law, “its violation will have a negative
impact on its ability to extract concessions from
others in exchange for its own promises in future
agreements.” Yet isn’t this conclusion just another
consequence of the heterogeneity of rules?
To be sure, reputational costs need to be
unpacked. Here Guzman brings back rational
choice. To begin with, states prefer payoffs now
over payoffs later on; hence, there is a general
“indifference between a payoff of 1 today and 1 ⫹
r tomorrow.” Guzman advises states to enter into
collateral treaties to increase future payoffs so that
r goes to zero. Forgive me for thinking that this
looks like calling for another skyhook. Since customary international law works and has worked
well over the millennia, we could just as well
deduce that ⫺r has already been built into the system. Future payoffs are systemically increased by
customary law itself, with the consequence that
the r factor cancels out. In the seminal Air Services
arbitration, for instance, the customary international law of proportionality included an extra
measure of retaliation to serve as a deterrent to
states that might otherwise find it profitable to violate rules in situations where they have already discounted the cost of rule-equivalent reciprocal violations.1
The rational choice theory espoused by Guzman appears to view cooperation as the reverse side
of the coin of conflict. If heads is avoiding war, tails
is cooperation. Of course, cooperation in this
sense is purely passive. It tells us nothing more
than would a minus sign. Yet the emerging interdisciplinary theory of rational choice is beginning
to allow for complementary goals that are the converse of each other rather than opposites. Applied
to international law, we might identify the binary
goals as war avoidance and welfare enhancement.
The doctrine of comparative advantage tells us
that stronger state A and its weaker neighbor B
may mutually maximize their welfare by trading
1
Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v.
Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417 (1978); see Lori Fisler Damrosch,
Retaliation or Arbitration— or Both? The 1978 United
States–France Aviation Dispute, 74 AJIL 785, 791
(1980).
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with one another. War cannot maximize their
joint welfare because it imposes a net loss on the
losing side’s capital infrastructure. I suggest that if
we look at trade as a systemic incentive for states to
maximize their own welfare over time, we add a
useful explanatory dimension to the narrow teleological view of international law as a set of prohibitions. Useful, but perhaps boring: students tend
to populate courses in political science that deal
with conflict rather than cooperation: stimulating
war is more fun than simulating peace.
Political scientists used to say that international
law is a distracting morality that interferes with a
hard-headed view of political reality. Guzman is of
political science’s second generation: international law cannot be left out of the story of international relations, though swords remain stronger
than words. Recall that Eric Posner said there is no
independent, provable evidence that states comply with international law. Guzman now responds
that there is no theoretical basis for the proposition
that customary international law cannot have an
independent influence on state behavior. Thus
one may choose between Posner’s view that “rational choice theory” does not prove the independent
influence of international law, and Guzman’s contention that “rational choice theory” does not disprove it. I’d say they’re both right.
Brian Lepard is another new voice in international law, though one would hardly know it from
the prodigious scope of his citations in Customary
International Law: A New Theory with Practical
Applications. The next person who wants to write
about customary international law might do well
to use Lepard’s footnotes as a bibliography.
Lepard begins by rehearsing the traditional
dilemma of the material and psychological sources
for determining a rule of customary law. If we look
at only the material source—namely, the practice
of states—we can’t tell whether states tend to be
repetitive in their practices because they believe
that a rule of customary law is compelling them
not to deviate, or because repetition is habitual or
comfortable, or because they just continue to do
what they’re doing until their self-interest dictates
that they should do something different, or
because they believe in a norm that guides their
practice, though the norm is not a legal norm. This
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last, somewhat unusual possibility occurred when,
a few centuries ago, states wrote their official treaties in French. They somehow believed that their
doing so would make the treaties more official or
solemn in some way, though no state actually
believed that a treaty was not binding unless it was
written in French. When states started to use other
languages in their treaties, no one objected on the
ground that the treaties were not written in
French. There was a norm, but not a legal norm.
After briefly considering rational choice theory,
Lepard has a new reply to Posner’s skepticism. He
says, in effect, that we can never know whether
state practice gives rise to opinio juris. And so he
takes the bold step of dispensing with state practice
altogether. All we will ever need from now on to
prove up a rule of customary international law is
the psychological component of opinio juris. To
take a pedestrian example, suppose we want to figure out whether a city has a law against jaywalking
by counting how many people cross the street in
the middle of the block. We find that some people
do and many others don’t. But we cannot derive
from that practice a rule against jaywalking. If we
could psychoanalyze every jaywalker and inquire
whether they believe there is a law against jaywalking, we might get closer to deriving a rule of law
except that many jaywalkers, rather than admit
that they know of such a rule, might simply lie to
us and say they didn’t think they were violating
any law. Of course, in any municipal example such
as this one, the easy answer is to look up the statutes, ordinances, and regulations of the city and
find out whether there is a law against jaywalking.
But in international customary law, there is no
place where one can look up a rule.
By focusing on opinio juris and freeing himself
from the mortal coil of state practice, Lepard lets
his thoughts take wings. At the most rarefied level,
what do state officials believe in? They believe in
ethics, says Lepard. At least there is no proof that
they disbelieve in ethics. In the troposphere below
the ethical level, officials believe in human rights.
At least they do not seem opposed to human
rights. We descend into the atmosphere and take
a deep breath. Here we find broad principles of
opinio juris: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, many UN General Assembly Resolutions,

2011]

167

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

the UN Charter itself, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and many others in
your nearby Documentary Supplement. But it is
only when we land on terra firma that we get closest to the content of opinio juris, namely, the travaux préparatoires of all the aforementioned documents. Lepard relies—perhaps a bit too
much— on the arguments that prevailed in the
drafting process as revealing the unadulterated
content of opinio juris.
In opting for the psychological component,
Lepard may be implying that the law always affects
state payoffs to some degree, whether or not it
shows up in their actual practices. But Lepard isn’t
even making that limited claim. His book is
devoted to demonstrating the content of international customary law for those readers who are
interested in its content. He is not claiming that
customary international law affects state behavior
even slightly. Yet the subtitle of his book is A New
Theory with Practical Applications. What practical
applications is he talking about if he excludes state
practice?
Consider for a moment two images: a tropical
rain forest, and a northern forest of thin-trunked
trees and sparse underbrush. In both images, the
trees and other plants all represent law. In natural
law theory, which has dominated international
law during most of its existence, law is unavoidable: you have to brush by plants and bushes on
your way through the (rain) forest. There is no case
or controversy that is untouched by law, although,
of course, some controversies are so trivial that the
law does not bother to adjudicate them. By contrast, legal positivism looks at legislative commands as so many individual trees that the traveler
can avoid simply by wending his way through the
forest. Where there is no tree, there is no law.
There is ostensibly more freedom in positivism
than in naturalism.
Brian Lepard aligns himself with political scientists in viewing international law as a one-way projection of authority. For Eric Posner, the spaces
between the trees are the most important; the trees
themselves can be circumvented. To take an
important current example: suppose Iran is on the
verge of producing intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Many heads of state,

international diplomats, and political scientists
would say that international law has nothing to do
with this situation. If nations decide to bomb
Iran’s underground missile silos, that would be an
act of realpolitik disconnected from international
law. Freedom to act works in both directions: Iran
is free to build weapons of mass destruction, and
other states are free to bomb them before they can
be deployed.
Lepard would reply that if states want to argue
about the legality of a surgical strike upon Iran’s
nuclear-weapons silos, then the source of that
legality is the theory of opinio juris that he has
spelled out in his book. By contrast, if states omit
international-law arguments from the practical
consideration of whether to engage in such a surgical strike, then international law does not have a
role to play. This is, indeed, a new theory of customary international law. The problem is the virtual impossibility of excluding international-law
discourse from diplomatic and strategic communications among states. International law has a
way of filling the legal plenum as vegetation has a
way of filling the tropical rain forest. Centuries of
practice have taught us that it is harder to argue
that international customary law does not apply to
a given controversy than it is to argue that the law
not only applies, but supports our position.
ANTHONY D’AMATO
Of the Board of Editors

BOOK REVIEWS
Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric
Conflict. By Michael L. Gross. Cambridge,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Pp. xiii, 321. Index. $92.00, £50, cloth;
$29.99, £17.99, paper.
Michael Gross is professor of political science
and chairman of the Department of International
Relations at the University of Haifa. His timely
book, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War, reflects
both his extensive study of the ethical problems
inherent in modern warfare and his experience, as

